Merchants and Courtiers. 
Hanseatic Representatives 
at the Spanish Court 
in the Seventeenth Century*

by Thomas Weller

Until recently historians have approached early modern diplomacy primarily in terms of court policy, dynastic rivalries, and political alliances among the leading members of Europe’s “princely society". Sixteenth and seventeenth-century manuals of diplomacy also imagine the “ideal ambassador” as a typical member of court society. Originally, however, diplomacy was an urban phenomenon. It was in the urban landscape of Renaissance Italy that the idea and practice of modern diplomacy were born and shaped before it was refined and perfected at the European courts and the great peace congresses of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But even after the Peace of Westphalia the political landscape of Europe was much more diverse than it might seem at first glance. Apart from the powerful dynastic states and their ambassadors, who dominated diplomacy in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there was a wide range of smaller and seemingly less powerful actors who were involved in the field of foreign relations, although most of them lacked full sovereignty as it would be defined by modern political theory.

A very interesting case is that of the Hanseatic League, a confederation of commercial cities whose origins can be traced back into the thirteenth century. At its peak in the late Middle Ages the so-called Hansa Teutonica consisted of up to 200 larger and smaller towns, most of them situated in the coastal regions of the North and Baltic Seas. In that period the Hanseatic League not only controlled the trade in this region, it also was an important political actor and even waged war against the surrounding kingdoms and principalities. Two centuries later, however, compared to the princely states – with their effective administrative apparatus, fiscal resources and military strength –, the formerly powerful confederation of towns seemed more and more a vestige of the Middle Ages. Apart from its military weakness, the Hanseatic League lacked legitimacy as a political actor, since it did not fit in the conceptual framework of modern state theory pushed forward by Jean Bodin and
other political thinkers of the age. According to Abraham de Wicquefort, the author of one of the most influential seventeenth-century treatises on diplomacy, the Hansa could only be considered a mere «society of merchants», since most of the Hanseatic cities did not even possess the «slightest feature of sovereignty».

Without being a state in the modern sense of the word, however, the Hansa did not cease to perform as such in the field of foreign relations. From the early seventeenth century onwards, the Hanseatic cities not only established a consular network that encompassed the most important trading port cities of the Iberian Peninsula and the western Mediterranean (Lisbon, Cádiz, Málaga, Alicante, Marseille, Livorno, Genoa, Venice), they also appointed diplomatic representatives to the principal European courts. By the end of the eighteenth century the Hanseatic League, now only consisting of the three remaining cities of Bremen, Lübeck, and Hamburg, had permanent representatives at the royal courts of Madrid, Lisbon, Paris, London, Copenhagen, and St. Petersburg.

It is no coincidence that the first of these permanent residents was accredited at the Spanish court. From the 1570s the Spanish crown had tried to impose trade embargos on the Dutch Provinces in order to suppress the rebellion in the northern part of the Netherlands. However, maritime trade was not only the backbone of the rebellious provinces, as Philip II and his advisors had rightly observed, but also crucial for the Spanish Monarchy itself. Spain depended on a whole range of products – such as grain, wood, copper, and iron – that had to be imported from Northern Europe. By supplying the Iberian Peninsula with these products the Hanseatic cities, which had already traded with the Iberian Peninsula in the Middle Ages, managed to gain ground lost to their Dutch competitors and soon turned into one of the most important trading partners of the Spanish Monarchy. Although the United Provinces were able to recover their dominant position in the Iberian marketplace during the Twelve Years’ Truce (1609-21) and after the Dutch-Spanish peace treaty of 1648, the Hanseatic merchants managed to maintain their commerce with the Iberian Peninsula, if on a smaller scale. The great importance of the Hispano-Hanseatic relationship is underlined by the fact that the Hanseatic cities were represented by a diplomatic agent at the Spanish court throughout the whole of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with only one brief vacancy between 1640 and 1649.
I

The origins of the Hanseatic representation at the Spanish court

The origin of the Hanseatic representation in Madrid is closely tied to that of the Hanseatic consulate in Lisbon, the first one on the Iberian Peninsula. As in many other trading places, the institution of the consulate arose from religious brotherhoods that united foreign merchants and sailors who shared a common geographic origin and, thus, formed a common “nation” in the pre-modern sense of the word. Such was the case with the confraternity of St Bartholomew in Lisbon, in which Dutch and German traders had gathered since the late Middle Ages. There is evidence of a Hanseatic consul in Lisbon as early as 1570. In this year Andrea Nuntio, “consul of the Hanseatic cities of the Eastern nation and some other cities from here [the Netherlands] trading with Portugal and Lisbon”, died and was replaced by Ambrósio de Góis, son of the Portuguese humanist Damião de Góis. In 1579 Friedrich Paulsen, a merchant from Lübeck, succeeded him in office.

One year later, however, after the union of the crowns of Portugal and Spain, Philip II of Spain conveyed the consulate of the “Dutch and German Nation” to Hans Kleinhart, a merchant from Augsburg who was succeeded in 1589 by his compatriot Konrad Roth. In 1605, when Roth was already advanced in years and everybody expected the Dutch merchant David Strenge to become his successor, Hans Kampferbeck, a Hanseatic merchant who had been living on the Iberian Peninsula for many years, came to Lübeck and delivered a memorandum to the Hanseatic cities in which he underlined the necessity to install a consul of Hanseatic origin in Lisbon and by no means a “foreigner”. In making this argument, he indirectly accused Roth of serving the interests of the Spanish Crown more than those of the Hanseatic merchants and, thus, recommended himself for the position.

Kampferbeck’s memorandum reached the Hanseatic cities at a very critical moment. In 1603, by issuing the so called Gauna-decree, the Spanish Crown had introduced a new import and export duty of 30 per cent that was charged indiscriminately to all traders, regardless of their origins and nationalities. While the crowns of France and England had managed to achieve an exemption from this extra charge by signing bilateral treaties with the Spanish monarchy in August and October 1604, the Hanseatic merchants continued to bear a heavy burden that threatened to suffocate their trade with the Iberian Peninsula almost completely. Hence, when Kampferbeck presented his memorandum to the Hanseatic Diet in July 1605, the deputies of the Hanseatic League’s member cities did not hesitate to accept his proposal and appointed him as a Hanseatic consul in Lis-
In doing so, the diet took up an idea that already had been discussed earlier. In 1601 the Diet had debated a plan to create Hanseatic consulates in Lisbon and Seville and to establish a permanent representative at the Spanish court in Madrid, albeit without coming to a decision. In view of the increasing difficulties facing the Iberian trade in the summer of 1605, however, the matter did not brook further delay.

Immediately after his appointment as a Hanseatic consul, Kampferbeck was ordered to go to Madrid and to start negotiations about the 30-per cent duty. At the Spanish court Kampferbeck met with great mistrust, since the Spanish ministers suspected the Hanseatic cities of making common cause with the Dutch rebels and transporting Dutch contraband on their ships. This suspicion was nourished by the imperial ambassador, Hans Khevenhüller, who was strictly against an alliance of the Spanish Crown with the Hanseatic cities and did his utmost to bring the latter into disrepute. In spite of Khevenhüller’s efforts, Kampferbeck finally achieved a moratorium on the 30-per cent duty, and in 1606 an extraordinary embassy was sent from Lübeck to Madrid in order to negotiate a commercial treaty with the Spanish monarchy. By signing this treaty in September 1607, Philip III not only guaranteed very favourable conditions to the Hanseatic merchants, he also gave the Hanseatic cities the right to establish their own consulates in the Spanish ports and to appoint a diplomatic agent in Madrid. In 1607 Kampferbeck, who had already been approved as a Hanseatic consul in Lisbon, took his oath of office as the first permanent representative of the Hanseatic league at the Spanish court.

Apart from the duties comparable to those of other diplomatic representatives at the Spanish court, i.e. gathering information and looking after the interests of the power they represented, one of the principal occupations of the Hanseatic agents in Madrid was to care for the concerns of the Hanseatic merchants in the great trading port cities of the Iberian Peninsula, especially in cases where there were conflicts with Spanish authorities. Most of these conflicts were about customs duties and confiscated goods or ships. In this regard, there was no clear distinction between the Hanseatic consuls in the Iberian port cities and the resident in Madrid. Moreover, until Portugal declared its independence from Spain in 1640, the agency in Madrid remained connected to the consulate in Lisbon.

From this point of view, the Hanseatic cities could hardly have found a more suitable person for the office than Hans Kampferbeck. In contrast
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to Roth, whose family came from Southern Germany, and Strenge, who had Dutch origins, Kampferbeck belonged to a Hanseatic merchant family with branches in Reval and Lübeck. He had lived for several years in Portugal and, thus, was well aware of the problems and needs of the Hanseatic merchants on the Iberian Peninsula. In addition, he was well connected to influential circles both at the Portuguese court in Lisbon and the Habsburg court in the Netherlands. In Portugal he had served the duke of Braganza; his brother-in-law, Antonio Rovelasca, was a chamberlain and a rent-master at the court of Archduke Albert in Brussels.

The fact that Kampferbeck literally talked himself into the office, when he delivered his memorandum to the Hanseatic Diet in 1605, was by no means exceptional. Most of the future Hanseatic representatives sent written applications to the Hanseatic cities, often accompanied by letters of recommendation from influential people. This was also the case with Kampferbeck’s successor Augustin Bredimus, who was in office between 1629 and 1640 and whose candidature was supported by the imperial ambassador in Madrid Franz-Christoph Khevenhüller. In contrast to Kampferbeck, Bredimus was not of Hanseatic origin but rather the scion of a merchant family from the city of Trier in southwest Germany. Whether because of the imperial ambassador’s recommendation or the lack of another candidate, the Hanseatic cities willingly accepted Bredimus’ candidature, a step they later regretted, when they found themselves involved in a long-lasting dispute over his salary. This also might have been the reason why the Hanseatic cities refused to accept Bredimus’ son Johann as his successor in office. After Augustin Bredimus’ death in August 1640 his brother Archangelus, a Capuchin friar, wrote several letters of recommendation for his nephew, but in vain.

The recruitment of diplomatic agents seems to have been a general problem among early modern merchant republics. In the case of the Dutch Republic important diplomatic posts often had to be «filled by second-rate men or go unfilled for long periods» when the United Provinces were granted the right to send an ambassador to the Spanish court by signing the Dutch-Spanish peace treaty in 1648, it took eight years to find a suitable person. Although the Hanseatic agency in Madrid was never vacant for longer periods (except from 1640 to 1649), as in the Dutch case, the position was not very attractive for members of the merchant cities’ ruling elites, not least because of the irregular payment and the high costs of living at the Spanish court.

The only exception to this general rule seems to be Bernhard Timmerscheidt who succeeded Bredimus in office in 1649.
was a cousin of the mayor of Münster, Johann Timmerscheidt; his father, Bernhard senior, had been a clerk of the municipal court. After his father’s untimely death, Bernhard junior had to earn his own living, working as a scribe for the Münster city council and later for a nobleman from Lübeck until he came to Madrid, where he first served Bredimus, from 1636 to 1637, and then the Venetian ambassador as a secretary. However, although Timmerscheidt belonged to one of Münster’s most prominent councillor families, his professional career was rather atypical and not very successful, at least in economic terms. As I will point out below, Timmerscheidt was heavily in debt when he died from an unexpected disease in 1649.

After his untimely death Timmerscheidt was followed in office by Walther Delbrügge who represented the Hanseatic cities at the Spanish court during almost half a century. Born in Lübeck as a nephew of one of the remaining Catholic canons at the cathedral, Delbrügge left his hometown to take up his studies at the University of Leuven in 1643. Later he came to Madrid where he worked for the Imperial Ambassador Francesco del Carretto until he took up his position as a Hanseatic resident in 1649. Like all of his predecessors Delbrügge had been the only candidate to the office. Three years before his death in 1699 Delbrügge managed to install his son Joseph as his successor. The latter was dismissed by the Spanish crown six years later in the course of the Spanish War of Succession and only returned to office from 1729 to 1733.

From the second half of the seventeenth century, the Hanseatic agents at the court seemed less closely linked to the sphere of commerce. In contrast to Kampferbeck and Bredimus, all of their successors in office had an academic background or at least lengthy professional experience as secretaries or scribes in the administrative apparatus of their home towns or in the service of foreign ambassadors at the Spanish court. This development seems to reflect a general trend towards professionalization within early modern diplomacy, although this process should not be overestimated. In his letter of recommendation for Bernhard Timmerscheidt, the city council of Münster wrote that «apart from reading and writing German and Latin, Timmerscheidt had a good command of most foreign languages, such as Spanish, French, and Italian, including advanced writing skills, and a solid foundation in law and politics». In contrast to the diplomatic practice of princely states and highly reputed republics such as Venice or Genoa, social rank or noble lineage clearly played a minor role for the recruitment of the Hanseatic cities’ diplomatic agents. However, having access to the Spanish court was as important for the fulfilment of the resident’s duties as professional knowledge. When Walther Delbrügge...
applied to succeed Bernhard Timmerscheidt, the city council of Lübeck praised the candidate’s qualities, putting special emphasis on the fact that Delbrügge «was proficient in Spanish, had studied at the famous university of Leuven, and had good access to influential persons at the Spanish court, since he had been working several years for the Imperial ambassador» 46.

It is obvious that, besides juridical and political knowledge, language skills were considered important for the residents’ business. Before assuming their office, all of the Hanseatic representatives had been living for several years on the Iberian Peninsula and, thus, were fluent in Spanish and familiar with Spanish culture. It is remarkable that all of them were Catholics, which was by no means self-evident, since the vast majority of the Hanseatic cities were Protestant. Ironically, the only Hanseatic resident who had to defend himself against suspicions about his faith was Augustin Bredimus, who was not of Hanseatic origin but came from Trier, one of the most important Archbishop’s seats of the Holy Roman Empire 47.

Although the diplomats’ familiarity with Spanish culture and language facilitated their business at the Madrid court, it was also, at times, the source of problems. This could be the case if the cultural assimilation of diplomats led to a loss of their original cultural background or even mother tongue, a phenomenon that frequently occurred within the second generation of migrant families. After Walther Delbrügge’s death in 1699 it soon came to light that his son Joseph, who had been appointed as his successor in the office three years before, could neither read nor write German 48. Of course, the Hanseatic cities were not pleased about that fact and continued to send him letters in German, ignoring Delbrügge’s complaints and frequent requests to write him in Spanish or Latin. The city of Hamburg even wanted to oblige Delbrügge to employ a German-speaking secretary who would translate his answers into German, since his Latin was not very good either 49.

3 A perennial problem: salaries and revenues

Complaints about bad and irregular payment were widespread among early modern diplomats. As far as their payment practices were concerned the Hanseatic cities were by no means better than any of the princely states of early modern Europe. However, there was one important difference. Whereas princely ambassadors could hope to have their expenses reimbursed after returning to their home countries in the form of titles or other princely favours, the Hanseatic representatives usually stayed abroad and had to content themselves with their ordinary salary and revenues.
In theory, the Hanseatic residents and consuls on the Iberian Peninsula were to be paid with money from a special fund, the so called "Hispanische Kollekte", that was originally founded to cover the costs of the special embassy to Madrid in 1606-07. This fund was financed by a tax imposed on the Iberian trade. However, whether because of the decrease of Spanish and Portuguese commerce after 1609, the delayed payments from the Hanseatic merchants or the unwillingness of the other Hanseatic cities to recollect the tax within their jurisdictions, the revenues from the fund were insufficient to cover the costs of the Hanseatic representatives. For this reason the three cities of Hamburg, Lübeck and Danzig (Gdańsk), which had the greatest interest in the Iberian trade and, thus, had also participated in the special embassy to Madrid, finally agreed to share the costs between them. Because of its larger trade volume, Hamburg was ready to finance 50 per cent of the resident’s salary, the other 50 per cent had to be covered by the other two towns. However, the city of Danzig had frequently to be reminded of its contributions. In 1653 the Danzig city councillors refused to increase the city’s share in order to raise the resident’s salary, arguing that Danzig’s economic situation was extremely difficult and the city’s Iberian trade hardly existent. By the end of the seventeenth century Danzig had ceased paying completely.

Not surprisingly, the Hanseatic residents in Madrid never stopped complaining about outstanding and irregular payments. For that reason, Hans Kampferbeck had to undergo serious economic hardships. In 1611 he was imprisoned, because he could not satisfy his creditors’ claims. Nevertheless, the Hanseatic cities decided to reduce his salary from 1,000 to 600 ducats, because the Iberian trade was in decline due to the Dutch-Spanish armistice and they had serious difficulties in raising enough money for the payment of the Hanseatic resident in Madrid. When Kampferbeck refused to accept the reduction of his yearly salary, the Hanseatic cities tried to replace him with Peter Körner from Hamburg, who was willing to do the job for less money. However, the latter was never confirmed by the Spanish king and Kampferbeck stayed in office.

Augustin Bredimus, who took over his duties after Kampferbeck’s death in 1629, had to wait almost three years before he received an initial payment of 1,000 ducats from the Hanseatic cities, corresponding to his first year’s salary as a Hanseatic resident. However, Bredimus argued that life in Madrid was very expensive and that his predecessor had received an additional allowance while he was staying at the court. If the Hanseatic cities were unable or unwilling to pay him the same allowance, he was prepared to take his residence in Lisbon where he would make do with
1,000 ducats per year, since the living was cheaper there and it was much easier to collect duties from the Hanseatic traders. Finally, Hamburg and Lübeck agreed to raise Bredimus’ salary by 200 ducats, as long as he stayed in Madrid. Interestingly enough, Lübeck’s city council was ready to accept Bredimus’ proposal to move to Lisbon, but the city of Hamburg argued that in times of political instability and war – the Thirty Years’ War was still menacing the Iberian trade – it was strictly necessary to maintain a permanent representative at the Spanish court. However, Bredimus was still dissatisfied with his payment. In the meantime he had drawn high bills of exchange on the Hanseatic cities, which the latter refused to honour. In January 1637 Bredimus appeared in Lübeck to negotiate with representatives from the cities of Hamburg and Lübeck about his salary. Apart from a substantial raise of his annual payment he reclaimed a remuneration of 12,000 ducats to cover outstanding payments and extraordinary expenditures in the preceding seven years. In October 1638 both sides signed a settlement according to which Bredimus would receive 2,000 ducats per year, as long as he resided in Madrid, and 1,200 while he was in Lisbon. Apart from his regular annual salary, the Hanseatic merchants in Spain and Portugal had consented to pay him a duty of 0.25 per cent of their sales.

Despite Bredimus’ complaints, he was better paid than any of his successors in office, who had to content themselves with far lower revenues. When Bernhard Timmerscheidt was appointed in 1649, he was awarded a yearly salary of only 400 ducats. The Hanseatic cities justified this substantial reduction of the Hanseatic resident’s salary with the decline of the Iberian trade during the Thirty Years’ War. Timmerscheidt protested, arguing that because of the high cost of living at the Spanish court and rising prices generally, his current income would not allow him to represent the Hanseatic cities adequately («pro decoro publico»). However, his complaints were in vain: the only answer he received was a statement that hopefully the «accidentalia», i.e. the duties he was allowed to charge from the Hanseatic merchants, would recompense him for his expenditures. When Timmerscheidt died from an unexpected disease a few month later, he still had not received his salary and was so heavily in debt that his estate had not even covered the burial costs. Finally the Hanseatic cities agreed to transfer Timmerscheidt’s complete first-year salary to his estate executors and heirs in order to satisfy his creditors.

Timmerscheidt’s successor in office, Walther Delbrügge, also complained about his low salary and pointed out that he could also not rely on the duties paid by private traders, because of the poor state of Spanish commerce. As his predecessor had, he pointed to the high cost of living...
at the Spanish court, where he could hardly support himself as a private person from his revenues, let alone fulfil his representational duties as a «public minister of such famous cities» («so berümten Städten publicus minister»). Hence, he suggested that the Hanseatic cities should not confer the official title and «real dignity» («würckliche dignitet») of a consul to him, because this would imply extra expenses. Instead, he proposed to fulfil the same duties as a «general procurator» (procurator generalis) of the Hanseatic cities at the Spanish court\(^68\). Interestingly enough, the Hanseatic cities agreed and changed the letter of credence for Delbrügge, which had already been issued, replacing the word «consul» by «Procurator nostrus generalis per Hispaniam»\(^69\). When Delbrügge's son Joseph succeeded his father in office, almost fifty years later, the question of the Hanseatic representative's title and diplomatic rank returned to the agenda. Although the Hanseatic cities were now willing to give Joseph Delbrügge a higher rank than his father, as I will point out below, they refused to pay him a fixed salary. In contrast to his father, Delbrügge junior had to content himself with the franchises and tax exemptions granted by the Spanish crown to foreign diplomats\(^70\).

4 Private interests and multiple loyalties

Since the regular income of the Hanseatic representatives was rather low, they were in constant need of additional revenues and, hence, all the more susceptible to the favours offered by the Spanish crown. Not surprisingly, the Hanseatic cities sometimes doubted the reliability of their own representatives or even suspected the latter of serving as double agents for the Spanish crown.

It is not quite clear to what extent the Hanseatic residents pursued their own business interests alongside their duties as diplomatic agents. Hans Kampferbeck seems to have been engaged in the spice trade. He was related by marriage to the Rovelasca family, who had important shares in the Portuguese pepper trade until the 1590s, and he had also cooperated with the Dutch merchant Jan Snel, who owned an export company in Lisbon\(^71\). In a memorandum to the Spanish crown in 1611 he proposed selling the complete Portuguese pepper stocks to the Hanseatic merchants in exchange for naval and military supplies, wood, and grain, in order to thin out the Dutch spice trade\(^72\). Although the project of a Hanseatic monopoly was never realized, it underlines how closely Kampferbeck's official activities as a Hanseatic resident in Madrid were linked to his own business activities and economic interests.

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This was by no means exceptional. Early modern diplomats were usually embedded in multiple networks of patronage, not only in their home country but also at the foreign courts, where they participated in the exchange of gifts and information. As any other member of early modern society they were expected to care for their relatives and clients. Thus, the line between official duties and private interests was necessarily blurry. In the Hanseatic cities’ case this general characteristic was compounded by an additional problem. Since the Hanseatic residents and consuls had to be confirmed by the Spanish king, it was not quite clear whether they were to be considered as officials of the Hanseatic League or the Spanish crown. In the commercial treaty of 1607 it was explicitly stated that whatever person the Hansaetic cities would elect to represent them, this person should be «willingly» («de buena gana») approved by the Spanish king. On more than one occasion, however, the crown’s refusal to confirm a chosen candidate caused conflicts and tensions. When Hans Kampferbeck was officially confirmed by the Spanish crown in 1614, the Hanseatic cities had already dismissed him and tried to replace him with another candidate, Peter Körner from Hamburg, whom they thought to be more suitable for the office and who was ready to do the job for less money. Körner received an instruction from the Hanseatic cities and took his oath of office in 1614, but in contrast to Kampferbeck he was never approved by the Spanish crown.

In the end, the Hanseatic cities had no other choice than to accept Kampferbeck as their representative if they did not want to go unrepresented at the Spanish court. However, the dispute over Kampferbeck’s salary was probably not the only reason why the Hanseatic cities tried to get rid of him. Kampferbeck had served as a double agent for the Spanish king on at least two occasions. In 1605, when he first appeared in Lübeck to deliver his memorandum to the Hanseatic Diet, he did not come deliberately and on his own account, as he told the assembly, but had instead been commissioned by Philip III. In 1616 Kampferbeck was sent to Flanders by order of the Spanish king to undermine an alliance between the United Provinces and the Hanseatic League. Kampferbeck was considered the most suitable person for this mission because of his «notorious knowledge of the conduct and tempers of these people».

From the Hanseatic cities’ point of view, things did not take a turn for the better when Kampferbeck was succeeded in office by Augustin Bredimus. In 1622, seven years before he became Kampferbeck’s successor, Bredimus had addressed a proposal to the Spanish crown in which he suggested importing copper from Hungary via Luxembourg to Flanders on...
the inland water ways in order to dry out the trade with Swedish copper carried out by the Dutch rebels and their Hanseatic accomplices. As in the case of many other contemporary authors of this sort of arbitrios addressed to the Spanish king, Bredimus not only hoped to receive a reward for his proposal, he probably also had in mind his own commercial interests or those of his relatives from Trier, who were engaged in the river shipping business on the Moselle.

If the Hanseatic cities had known about Bredimus' memorandum, they probably would not have appointed him as their representative at the Spanish court. However, it was no secret that Bredimus was on the Spanish king's payroll. In 1637, when Bredimus demanded outstanding payments and a substantial salary increase from the Hanseatic cities, he had no scruples about mentioning that he already received an annual pension of 25,000 ducats from the Spanish king. Consequently the Hanseatic cities had serious doubts about the reliability of their representative, although, according to his own account, Bredimus had always done his utmost to defend the Hanseatic merchants' interests against interference by Spanish authorities. In 1628 the Spanish crown had authorized Gabriel de Roy, the Spanish representative in Glückstadt, to issue certificates for any outgoing ship to the Iberian Peninsula in order to prevent the illicit trade in Dutch goods. The Hanseatic cities protested sharply against this measure, but in vain. For that reason, in 1635 Bredimus left Madrid and went to Vienna, where two envoys from Hamburg were already negotiating with Emperor Ferdinand II and his advisors about the matter. In the end, the Emperor took the Hanseatic cities' side and forbade de Roy explicitly from continuing with the incriminated practice. It is not quite clear what contribution Bredimus made to this outcome, but in any case he had not come to Vienna only for this reason. Two month after his arrival at the imperial court he and his family were knighted by Emperor Ferdinand II. Furthermore, the Emperor appointed Bredimus as a General Consul of the whole German Nation in Spain. The Hanseatic cities were informed of Bredimus' appointment and ordered by imperial decree to arrange an appropriate remuneration of the newly appointed consul.

It is obvious that Bredimus' eagerness to accumulate titles and honours not only reveals his social aspirations but also had an economic background. Apart from the expected salary increase, as a consul of the whole German nation Bredimus was authorized to charge duties from any German merchant in Spain and Portugal, regardless of whether that merchant was a Hanseatic citizen or not. In the same fashion, Hans Kampferbeck had managed to gain an appointment by the Spanish king as a consul of the
Dutch and German nation in Lisbon after Konrad Roth’s death in 1610, in addition to his position as a Hanseatic representative. Ironically, it had been Kampferbeck himself who had given the advice to create a Hanseatic consulate in Lisbon seven years earlier and to separate it from the existing mixed institution.

The concept of “nation” and the question of sovereignty

Kampferbeck’s effort to reunite the Dutch and Hanseatic consulates was clearly contrary to the political and commercial interests of the Hanseatic cities, who were competing with the United Provinces in the Iberian marketplace, and also in defiance to Kampferbeck’s oath of office. According to their oaths of office the Hanseatic residents were strictly forbidden to hold multiple posts and to represent any nation other than their own. However, the concept of “nation” used in this context was anything other than clear-cut and was very distant from the modern meaning of the word. According to a list handed out to the ministers of Philip III by the Hanseatic delegates in 1607, among the 72 member-cities of the Hanseatic League there were no less than 12 Dutch towns, the others belonged to the German-speaking parts of the Holy Roman Empire or to its neighbouring territories. Not surprisingly, in Lisbon and in many other places on the Iberian Peninsula, there was no clear distinction between Hanseatic, Dutch or German merchants. Mixed institutions survived or were still founded in the seventeenth century, such as the “Consulate of the Flemish and German Nation” in Seville.

As far as the Hanseatic agency in Madrid was concerned the Hanseatic cities’ relation to the Holy Roman Empire was particularly crucial. As with any other political territory of the Holy Roman Empire the Hanseatic cities could not claim full sovereignty. In 1606 the imperial ambassador Hans Khevenhüller had questioned the Hanseatic cities’ right to send an embassy to Madrid and to sign a treaty with the Spanish king without the Emperor’s prior consent. After 1607, however, the Hanseatic cities’ right to appoint permanent representatives at the Spanish court was widely accepted, although the latter’s status and function in relation to the imperial ambassador was never clearly defined.

The coexistence of the imperial ambassador and the Hanseatic representative in Madrid provided a kind of double-structure that could prove helpful for the Hanseatic merchants in cases of conflict with Spanish authorities; it might also cause problems. In 1621, when the Hanseatic merchants of Lisbon wanted Philip IV to reconfirm their privileges, they
did not turn to Kampferbeck, who was still in office in spite of his conflict with the Hanseatic cities. Instead, they contacted the imperial ambassador in Madrid, Franz Christoph Khevenhüller, a nephew of Hans Khevenhüller. At Khevenhüller’s instigation the imperial secretary Carlos Gagino was ordered to push forward the Hanseatic merchants request. The merchants agreed and even consented to provide Gagino a percentage of their sales as recompense for his efforts. The Hanseatic cities protested immediately against Khevenhüller’s intervention, since it questioned the Hanseatic resident’s authority, but their complaints were in vain.

In general, however, the relationship between the Imperial ambassadors and the Hanseatic cities seemed rather amicable. The Hanseatic cities frequently called upon the imperial ambassador’s assistance in times of political tension with the Spanish crown. In 1624, for instance, Franz Christoph Khevenhüller interceded with the Spanish crown in order to lift an embargo imposed on Hanseatic ships in Andalusia. After Kampferbeck’s death in 1629, it was the same Franz Christoph Khevenhüller who successfully supported the candidature of Augustin Bredimus. Twenty years later Walther Delbrügge was promoted in the same fashion by the imperial ambassador Francesco del Carretto. Nevertheless, when their right to diplomatic representation at the Spanish court was at stake, the Hanseatic cities were always keen on maintaining their prerogative, however close their political ties to the Holy Roman Empire might have been. In 1649, when Bernhard Timmerscheidt was appointed as a Hanseatic resident in Madrid the Hanseatic cities reminded him that he did not need any further confirmation by the Emperor or the imperial ambassador. According to the treaties signed with the Spanish crown the Hanseatic cities were free to nominate diplomatic representatives on their own initiative. Although Bredimus had been appointed as a consul of the “German Nation” by Emperor Ferdinand II in 1635, this was only an additional title that had proved harmful rather than useful from the Hanseatic cities’ point of view and was by no means necessary.

6 Diplomatic rank and ceremony

For seventeenth-century contemporaries the questions discussed above were inseparably tied to the issue of diplomatic ceremonial. From the very beginning of modern diplomacy, ceremony was paramount to the interaction of diplomatic representatives at European courts, and disputes about diplomatic ranks and precedence formed part of the diplomats’ everyday life. However, it was not before the second half of the seventeenth century
that a generally accepted system of diplomatic ranks emerged\(^96\). Having this in mind, it is significant that the first commercial treaty signed by the Hanseatic League and the Spanish monarchy in 1607 did not define the diplomatic rank of the Hanseatic representative at the Spanish court. According to article 44 of that treaty the Hanseatic cities had the right to send «one of their own to our palace» («enviar uno de los suyos a nuestro palacio»)\(^97\). By contrast, when the treaty was confirmed in 1647, on the occasion of the peace congress in Münster, this passage was slightly changed. Now, the Hanseatic cities were granted the right to have their «own agent at our court» («un agente propio en nuestra Corte»)\(^98\).

According to seventeenth-century tracts the term “agent” corresponded to the lowest of three diplomatic ranks that enabled distinguishing the respective “character” of a diplomat in accordance with the juridical status of the political entity he represented. Only sovereigns, that is to say monarchs and highly reputed republics like Venice or the Dutch Republic, had the right to send first-rank “ambassadors” to foreign courts. Other political actors, by contrast, had to content themselves with “envoys” or simple “agents”\(^99\). For that reason Abraham de Wicquefort admonished the Hanseatic League that it was not permissible to raise itself to the status of a sovereign by conferring the same or even higher diplomatic ranks on its diplomatic agents than those appropriate only to princely representatives\(^100\). It is noteworthy, though, that Wicquefort did not deny the Hanseatic League the principal right to send envoys to – or maintain permanent representatives at – the European courts: his only concern was the diplomatic rank of such representatives.

Regarding the Hanseatic resident in Madrid, however, it is striking that until the second half of the seventeenth century the Hanseatic cities usually speak of their “consul”, without making any distinction between their representative at the court and the Hanseatic consuls in the Iberian trading port cities. One possible reason might be that until 1640 the diplomatic agency in Madrid was tied to the consulate in Lisbon. In addition, in the seventeenth century the difference between consuls and diplomatic agents was still not as clear-cut as it would later become\(^101\).

As we have already seen, when Walther Delbrügge came into office, he even proposed to relinquish the official title of a “consul” in order to lower representational costs, an idea that the city councillors of Hamburg and Lübeck found highly appealing. Interestingly enough, in 1680, it was the same Walther Delbrügge who complained at the Spanish court because he was not granted the same privileges as the diplomatic representatives of other powers. Among other things, Delbrügge demanded a balcony dur-
ing the bullfights – still today a strong indicator of a person’s place within Spanish society. Delbrügge also asked for a *joya* (literally a “jewel”), *i.e.* an exemption from taxes, a privilege that foreign diplomats at the court shared with Spanish nobles and clerics. Significantly, it was because of this second demand that the Spanish crown had reservations about Delbrügge’s petition, arguing that there were already too many people at the court who had been freed from taxes.

This incident not only illustrates the close intertwining of symbolic and economic profits within court society, it also demonstrates how closely the levels of micro and macro-policy were connected. Although Delbrügge probably had his personal advantage and social position in mind, his individual rank and ceremonial treatment also defined the Hanseatic cities’ standing and reputation in relation to the other foreign powers represented at the Spanish court.

Surprisingly, up to this time, the Hanseatic cities had not seemed particularly concerned about their representative’s title and rank. Two years after the Peace of Westphalia, in which the question of sovereignty and the right to diplomatic representation had been at stake, the Hanseatic cities willingly preferred to reduce the cost of their representation by lowering their representative’s rank. When Delbrügge’s son Joseph received his letter of credence, which was written in the same fashion as the one for his father almost fifty years before, he immediately demanded corrections with regard to his “character”. Delbrügge pointed out that for several years other powers like Poland, Mainz, Neuburg Lorraine, and Genoa – which had formerly only been represented by residents at the Spanish court – had given the title of “envoy” to their diplomatic representatives. According to Delbrügge this had two reasons. First, only the envoys were assigned a permanent member of the State Council as a contact partner who presented their requests to the king. The other diplomatic representatives, by contrast, could only contact the Secretary of State, who was always overburdened with work: dealing through him meant their matters were delayed, placing them at a disadvantage. Second, and this seemed to be the primary reason for Delbrügge’s action, envoys enjoyed complete exemption from all taxes. Therefore, Delbrügge appealed to the Hanseatic cities to appoint him as their “envoy” or “ablegatus”, a title that would heighten the Hanseatic cities’ authority and facilitate their transactions at the Spanish court. However, the fact that Delbrügge’s father had only been a resident complicated the matter. The Conductor of Ambassadors at the Spanish court refused to introduce Joseph Delbrügge with a title superior to that of his father. Delbrügge’s case
was still undecided when the outbreak of the Spanish War of Succession forced him to abandon Madrid.

7 Conclusion

In many respects the Hanseatic residents in Madrid hardly differed from the representatives of other powers at the Spanish court. A lack of funds, uncertain revenues, and complaints about the high costs of court life were common among early modern diplomats, no matter what kind of political entity they represented. However, there were certain differences between the diplomatic representatives of small merchant republics like the Hanseatic cities and those of the large dynastic states.

In the course of the seventeenth century the difference between sovereign states and other political actors became increasingly important, although the significance of the Peace of Westphalia as a turning point has sometimes been overestimated. As with most of the other early modern republics, the Hanseatic cities lacked full sovereignty, and consequently their diplomatic representatives had to content themselves with lower diplomatic ranks. At the same time, many of the Imperial cities within the Holy Roman Empire became increasingly aware of their marginalization and did not spare any effort or expense to be acknowledged as equal in rank to the princely states in the field of diplomatic ceremony, albeit with poor results. With this in mind, it is remarkable that until the second half of the seventeenth century the Hanseatic cities seemed not to be overly concerned about their representative’s rank at the Spanish court. On the contrary, many city councillors had strong reservations against the high cost of maintaining a permanent resident in Madrid.

The concern about representational costs and the low prestige of diplomacy were common among merchant republics. In contrast to the princely states and their ambassadors in most early modern republics, there was no such thing as a diplomatic career, nor any form of recompense in form of titles or princely favours after a diplomat’s return to his territory of origin. As a consequence, the position of a diplomatic representative was not very attractive for the members of the merchant cities’ ruling elites, and the recruitment of diplomats frequently proved problematic. Most of the Hanseatic cities’ residents were already living in Spain when they were appointed. Joseph Delbrügge had even been born in Madrid and did not speak a word of German. Although this clearly was an exception, the Hanseatic residents’ alienation from their original
cultural background may have contributed to the cities’ mistrust of their own representatives. To a certain extent, the problem of multiple loyalties and the intertwining of official duties and private interests were typical of early modern diplomacy in general. However, the susceptibility of some of the Hanseatic residents to favours and money offered by the Spanish crown seems to have been a direct consequence of their comparatively meagre and irregular remuneration. In fact, at least two of the Hanseatic cities’ representatives received additional money from the Spanish king. Hans Kampferbeck evidently served as a double agent. One of the reasons for the Hanseatic cities’ irregular payment practices related to internal differences about the funding of the Hanseatic agency in Madrid. In the end, only the cities of Hamburg, Lübeck, and Danzig were willing to finance the resident’s salary. Danzig suspended its contributions by the end of the seventeenth century.

Regardless of all these problems and restraints, the Hanseatic cities were quite successful in maintaining a considerable scope of action on the field of foreign relations throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. After the treaty with the Spanish crown of 1607 the Hanseatic cities’ right to appoint permanent representatives at the Spanish court was undisputed. From that time onward the Hanseatic residents were also fully accepted by the imperial ambassadors; the latter even supported the candidature of some of the future Hanseatic agents. In 1647 the treaty with the Spanish king was reconfirmed in Münster, and one year later the Hanseatic cities were officially included as a political body in the peace Treaty of Westphalia.

This unexpected diplomatic success was all the more surprising since at the very same time the Hanseatic League had to face a process of political crisis and internal erosion. Whereas the Dutch Provinces (and also the Swiss Confederation) managed to convert themselves into sovereign states after 1648 – not least because of their territorial cohesion and military strength –, the Hanseatic League remained a highly complex political body whose members belonged to different political territories and seldom spoke with one voice. In practice, the formerly powerful Hanseatic League consisted of an ever smaller number of active members: only nine cities joined the last Hanseatic Diet in 1669. Nevertheless, it has rightly been pointed out that it was precisely the diplomatic and consular network abroad – maintained and financed by the three remaining cities of Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen – that kept the Hanseatic League alive as a body politic until the end of the ancien régime and beyond.
Notes

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7. «Car estant composée de villes, qui estoient la pluspart municipales, y qui n’avoient point de marques de Souveraineté du tout, mais dépendoient de Princes, qui les gouvernoient comme leurs autres sujets, elles ne puvoient faire entre elles qu’une societé de marchands»; Wicquefort, *L’ambassadeur*, cit., p. 33.

8. Duchhardt, *Hanse*, cit., p. 15, aptly characterizes the Hansa «ein politisches Konstrukt, das sich wie ein Staat aufführt, ohne ein Staat zu sein» (a political construct that performed as a state without being a state).


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16. «Consul van den henze steden oostersche natie ende eenige steden van herwertsover Portugal ende Lisbona frequenterende», quoted in R. Häpke, Niederländische Akten und Urkunden zur Geschichte der Hanse und zur deutschen Seegeschichte, Bd. ii, Borchers, Lübeck 1923, p. 266; see also Beutin, Entstehung, cit., p. 439; Poettering, Handel, cit., p. 89.

17. Beutin, Entstehung, cit., p. 439; Poettering, Handel, cit., p. 89.


26. Capítulos de Privilegios concedidos a las Ciudades Confederadas de la Hansa Teutónica [...] en Madrid a 28 de Septiembre de 1607, in Colección de los Tratados de Paz [...] hechos por los pueblos, reyes y príncipes de España [...] (art. 43 and 44); Reynado de Felipe iii, dir. por J. Abreu y Bertodano, Parte i, Madrid 1740, pp. 375-82: 381 (art. 43 and 44); Weller, Cónsules, cit., p. 74.

27. ahl, asa, Externa, Hispanica, 9, ff. 405-7; Poettering, Handel, cit., p. 97.


31. AHL, ASA, Externa, Hispanica, 63, Lübeck to Hamburg, Lübeck, 12 November 1629; Fink, Diplomatische Vertretungen, cit., p. 120.


33. ABL, ASA, Externa, Hispanica, 63, Archangelus Bredimus to the City Council of Lübeck, Köln, 2 and 10 October 1640; Lübeck to Archangelus Bredimus, Lübeck, 16 October 1640.


36. ABL, ASA, Externa, Hispanica, 69, Timmerscheidt’s appointment and oath of office, Lübeck, 5 April 1649; Fink, Diplomatische Vertretungen, cit., p. 122.


39. ABL, ASA, Externa, Hispanica, 69, Münster to Lübeck, Münster, 11 May 1647; Timmerscheidt to the Hanseatic delegates at the peace congress in Münster, Madrid, 25 August 1647.


41. ABL, ASA, Externa, Hispanica, 71, Delbrügge to Lübeck, Madrid, 14 July 1649; Lübeck to Hamburg, Lübeck, 4 August 1649.

42. ABL, ASA, Externa, Hispanica, 74, Hamburg to Lübeck, Hamburg, 28 April 1696; Lübeck to Walter Delbrügge, Lübeck, 24 May 1696. See also Fink, Diplomatische Vertretungen, cit., p. 122, who erroneously dates Walther Delbrügge’s death as occurring in 1697.

43. ABL, ASA, Externa, Hispanica, 74, Joseph Delbrügge to Lübeck, Madrid, 12 December 1703; ABL, ASA, Externa, Hispanica, 76.


46. «[…] das er der Hispanischen und andern Sprachen mechtig und von der berühmten Universität Löwen in Brabant nachen Madritt vereiset ist, woselbst er sich erzliche Jahr lang bey dem kayerlichen ordinar Ambassadeur aufgehalten und er hohen ortes guten acces hatte»; ABL, ASA, Externa, Hispanica, 71, Lübeck to Hamburg, 4 August 1649.
47. AGS, Estado 2315, fol. 3, The City Council and the Archbishop of Trier to Philip IV, confirming that Bredimus had served for several years in the Spanish army and that he had always been loyal to the Catholic Church, Trier, 16 August 1625.
48. «[…] Germanici non absolute conscius sum»; AHL, ASA, Externa, Hispanica, 74, Hamburg to Lübeck, Lübeck, 13 July 1653; Danzig to Lübeck, Danzig, 10 December 1653; AHL, ASA, Externa Hispanica, 72, Danzig to Lübeck, Danzig, 4 December 1654.
51. AHL, ASA, Externa, Hispanica, 71, Danzig to Lübeck, Danzig, 9 July 1653; Lübeck to Danzig, Lübeck, 13 July 1653; Danzig to Lübeck, Danzig, 10 December 1653; AHL, ASA, Externa Hispanica, 74, Lübeck to Danzig, Lübeck, 13 February 1702.
52. Poettering, Handel, cit., p. 94.
54. AHL, ASA, Externa, Hispanica, 62; Poettering, Handel, cit., p. 95; Beutin, Entstehung, cit., p. 444.
55. See below note 74.
56. AHL, ASA, Externa, Hispanica, 64, Hamburg to Lübeck, Hamburg, 29 February and 6 March 1612; Lübeck to Hamburg, Lübeck, 24 August 1612; Hamburg to Lübeck, Hamburg, 13 September 1612; Bredimus to Lübeck, Madrid, 10 August 1632; Lübeck to Bredimus, Lübeck, 28 December 1632.
57. AHL, ASA, Externa, Hispanica, 64, Bredimus to Lübeck, Madrid, 25 January 1633.
59. Ibid.; AHL, ASA, Externa, Hispanica, 65, Bredimus to the City Council of Lübeck, January 1637.
60. Ibid.
61. AHL, ASA, Externa, Hispanica, 66; AHL, ASA, Externa, Vario, 268e, settlement between the Hanseatic cities and Augustin Bredimus, Lübeck, 27 October 1638.
63. AHL, ASA, Externa, Hispanica, 69, Timmerscheidt to Lübeck, June 1649.
64. Ivi, Lübeck to Timmerscheidt, n.d. (1649).
65. Ivi, Joachim Möller to the City Council of Münster, Madrid, 12 July 1649; Joachim Möller to the City Council of Lübeck, Madrid, 20 July 1649; Johannes Timmerscheidt, mayor of Münster, to the city council of Lübeck, Münster, 12 August 1649.
66. AHL, ASA, Externa, Hispanica, 69, Lübeck to Johannes Timmerscheidt, Lübeck, 23 November 1649.
67. «Weil die accidentalia von den privatis wegen abgang der negotien also schlecht fallen werden, das drauff gar keine rechnung zu machen»; AHL, ASA, Externa, Hispanica, 71, Delbrügge to Lübeck, Madrid, 3 January 1650.
68. Ibid.
70. AHL, ASA, Externa, Hispanica, 74, Lübeck to Delbrügge, Lübeck, March 1704; see below note 102.
72. AGS, Estado, leg. 2852.
73. H. von Thiessen, Korrupierte Gesandte? Konkurrierende Normen in der Diplomatie der
Thomas Weller


74. Capítulos de Privilegios concedidos a las Ciudades Confederadas de la Hansa Teutónica [...] en Madrid a 28 de Septiembre de 1607, in Colección de los Tratados, dir. por Abreu y Bertodano, cit., p. 381.


77. «Por su notorio y mucho conocimiento de los tratos y humores de aquella Gente»; AGS, Estado, leg. 2331, fol. 123.


80. Alt, Asa, Externa, Hispanica, 65, Bredimus to the City Council of Lübeck, January 1637.

81. AGS, Estado, leg. 2329; Alcalá Zamora, España, cit., p. 279; Israel, Entrepots, cit., p. 293.

82. Alt, Asa, Externa, Hispanica, 64, Ferdinand II to Gabriel de Roy, Schloss Ort, 29 August 1635.

83. Ivi, Decree of Ferdinand II addressed to the Hanseatic cities, Vienna, 22 October 1635.

84. Alt., Nachlass Hagedorn, 91, fol. 198; Poettering, Handel, cit., p. 93; Fink, Diplomatische Vertretungen, cit., p. 120.

85. Beutin, Entstehung, cit., p. 442.

86. Alt, Asa, Externa, Hispanica, 9, ff. 405-7; Poettering, Handel, cit., p. 91.


88. Alt, Asa, Externa, Hispanica, 9, fol. 409; AGS, Estado, leg. 2852.


91. Meier, Geschichte, cit., p. 125.

92. Ault, Externa, Hispanica, 15, ff. 1-3 (Khevenhüller to the German merchants of Lisbon, Madrid, 12 January 1623), ff. 4-5 (The German merchants of Lisbon to the City Council of Lübeck, Lisbon, 16 February 1623).


94. Ags, Estado, leg. 2786, Consulta del Consejo de Estado, 28 January 1624. I thank Ulrich Nagel for bringing this source to my attention.

95. Ault, Externa, Hispanica, 69, Lübeck to Bernhard Timmerscheidt, July 1649.


97. Capítulos de Privilegios concedidos a las Ciudades Confederadas de la Hansa Teutónica, cit., p. 382 (art. 44).

98. Tratado ajustado entre los Plenipotenciarios de S. M. Catholica, y los Diputados de las Ciudades Hanseaticas [...] en Munster a 1/11 de Septiembre de 1647, in Colección de los Tratados de Paz [...] hechos por los pueblos, reyes y principes de España [...] , Reynado de Phelipe iv, dir. por J. Abreu y Bertodano, Parte vi, Madrid 1751, pp. 49-70: 58 (art. 3).


100. «Ce n’est pas aux villes Hanseatiques à s’eriger en Souverains, et à donner à leurs Ministres une qualité, que les Princes d’Allemagne n’ont pas encore pu obtenir pour les leurs»; Wisquefort, L’ambassadeur, cit., p. 32.


102. Ags, Estado, leg. 4125, Consulta del Consejo de Estado, 21 January 1680.


104. Ault, Externa, Hispanica, 74, Joseph Delbrügge to the City Council of Lübeck, Madrid, 10 October 1697.

105. Ivi, Joseph Delbrügge to the City Council of Lübeck, Madrid, 30 January 1698.

